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Satisficing Consequentialism Still Doesn’t Satisfy
JOE SLATER
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Satisficing consequentialism is an unpopular theory. Because it
permits gratuitous suboptimal behaviour, it strikes many as wildly
implausible. It has been widely rejected as a tenable moral theory for
more than twenty years. In this paper, I rehearse the arguments behind
this unpopularity, before examining an attempt to redeem satisficing.
Richard Yetter Chappell has recently defended a form of “effort sat-
isficing consequentialism”. By incorporating an “effort ceiling” –– a
limit on the amount of willpower a situation requires –– and requir-
ing that agents produce at least as much good as they could given
how much effort they are exerting, Chappell avoids the obvious objec-
tions. However, I demonstrate that the revised theory is susceptible
to a different objection, that the resulting view requires that any su-
pererogatory behaviour must be efficient, which fails to match typical
moral verdicts.
In this paper, I claim that understanding what is morally ‘good enough’
in terms of effort rather than the goodness of outcome produced cannot
salvage satisficing consequentialism. Traditional versions of the theory have
suffered extensive criticism, largely due to their condoning of gratuitous
preventions of goodness. In the first section, I present the motivations for
1
moving towards satisficing consequentialism, and rehearse the arguments
against that move.
The second section acknowledges an attempt to change this. Richard
Yetter Chappell has recently attempted to resurrect satisficing consequen-
tialism.1 By incorporating an “effort ceiling” – a limit on the amount of
willpower a situation requires – but requiring that agents produce at least
as much good as they could given how much effort they are exerting, Chap-
pell avoids the common objection.
Finally, I argue that Chappell’s account leaves his satisficing consequen-
tialism susceptible to another criticism. His position holds that any su-
pererogation must be perfectly efficient. While there are notable cases where
doing nothing is permissible, but doing some (but not the most) good is not,
many examples do not seem to have this feature. I provide several such ex-
amples. I suggest that this is a very serious problem for an effort-based
view of satisficing consequentialism, and indicates that any such view is still
unsatisfactory.
1 The Rise and Fall of Satisficing
Not content with the existing forms of consequentialism, Michael Slote
popularised (but later rejected) satisficing consequentialism.2 Typical act-
consequentialism, which requires that one bring about the most good, seems
extremely demanding. If correct, many of us are under a moral obligation
to work extremely long hours, perhaps in jobs that do not fulfil us (if un-
fulfilling jobs pay significantly more), and donate the vast majority of our
disposable income to the best causes. We could spend enough on ourselves
1Richard Yetter Chappell, ‘Willpower Satisficing’, Nouˆs 53 (2019), pp. 251-263.
2Michael Slote, ‘Satisficing Consequentialism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
suppl. vol.58 (1984), pp. 139-163.
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to ensure that we are psychologically able to continue this sort of life, but
our lives would be very austere.
Slote recognised that these conclusions about how demanding morality
is seem to defy common-sense.3 Noting the appeal of viewing rightness as
depending on the consequences of an action, he thus sought to soften the the-
ory. No longer would the most good be required. Instead, one could permis-
sibly just do “enough”. Abandoning the maximising constraint does seem
like a sensible move for those sympathetic to the consequentialist project.
The moral satisficer claims that agents may, sometimes, elect to perform
an action that is good enough, regardless of whether it is the best moral
option. The claim is not that that a decision procedure that does not require
maximising is actually best in the long run. That may be a plausible claim
– efforts to the do the best might be stressful, or lead to an agent failing
to achieve a good outcome due to refusing to settle for less than perfect,
and ending up with nothing – but that is not the focus here.4 Satisficing
consequentialists accept what Tim Mulgan calls “blatant moral satisficing”,
the claim that even “when the agent already knows which particular act
is best from a Consequentialist perspective, she is still perfectly justified in
selecting any other act which is good enough”.5 It holds that it is permissible
to act sub-optimally in cases where there is no moral reason that speaks in
favour of doing the less good option.
Slote illustrates this with two main examples. First, he considers a hotel
manager who discovers a family whose car has broken down outside the
3Slote, ‘Satisficing Consequentialism’, p. 142.
4Even non-consequentialists might endorse some form ‘strategic satisficing’. Christine
Swanton, for instance, suggests that strategies to satisfice rather than pursue the good
directly do seem rational, e.g. Christine Swanton, ‘Satisficing and Virtue’, The Journal of
Philosophy 90,(1993), pp. 33-48.
5Tim Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism, (Oxford, 2001), p. 128.
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building.6 They do not have money to pay for a room or a meal, but the
manager offers them one of the rooms in the hotel out of beneficence. She
does not offer them the best room, but simply the first suitable one she finds
available, which she deems to be good enough, knowing that there are other
better rooms she could find very easily.
Second, he provides an example of a fallen warrior. Because of his hero-
ism, the gods decide to grant him a single wish for those he is leaving behind.
Presented with such an opportunity, may not the warrior
wish for his family to be comfortably well off forever after? And
will we from a common-sense standpoint consider him to have
acted wrongly or non-benevolently towards his family because
he (presumably knowingly) rejected an expectably better lot for
them in favour of what was simply good enough? Surely not.7
Slote suggests that we would not condemn the hero not wishing that
they be only “comfortably well off” rather than extremely well off. Even
though alternative wishes would have required the same effort, Slote claims
that the less generous wish is permissible.
This allows the satisficer to easily evade the demandingness objection.
Agents may permissibly give some of their income to successful charities,
and keep a nice amount for themselves, so long as their actions are good
enough.
There are a variety of ways satisficing consequentialism can be under-
stood. These typically vary with how the “good enough” condition is inter-
preted. Slote actually suggests that the “enoughness” will be formalisible in
terms of some “percentage or mathematical function” taking into account
6Slote, ‘Satisficing’, p. 149
7Slote, ‘Satisficing’, pp. 150-151.
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of the amount of good that one could do.8 This would permit agents to
act in many ways we do deem praiseworthy, yet still forbid complete moral
slacking off. When an agent does do more than is “good enough”, they act
supererogatorily. There are many different ways that “good enough” could
be interpreted. Ben Bradley, for instance, offers six different ways.9 All of
the views, however, fall prey to the same devastating objection.10
The objection is due to the permissive verdicts satisficers must give about
gratuitous prevention of goodness. The typical moral satisficer must accept
that it is sometimes permissible to perform an action worse than one could.
In order to respond to the demandingness objection, a huge motivation (if
not the entire raison d’eˆtre) for satisficing views, it must actually permit
actions much worse than maximising. To see this, we can think about the
type of life that the satisficer might want to think is permissible. Even if an
agent gives considerably more than average to an effective charity (say 40%
of a modest income), and spends three nights a week volunteering, as well
as being a generally friendly, kind person in their normal interactions, they
are falling way short of maximising. But surely this is precisely the type of
behaviour a satisficer wants to say is permissible. So, satisficers must accept
that acting significantly sub-optimally is in some (many, in fact) situations
permissible.
But once we accept this, very counterintuitive verdicts follow. Tim Mul-
gan illustrates this with the following example:
The Magic Game: Achilles is locked in a room, with a
8Slote, ‘Satisficing’, p. 156.
9Ben Bradley, ‘Against Satisficing Consequentialism’, Utilitas 18 (2006), pp. 97-108,
at 101.
10Bradley describes how each of the six interpretations are understood, and how each
of them cannot respond adequately to the objection (‘Against Satisficing’, pp. 101-104).
I will not repeat these explanations here.
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single door. In front of him is a computer screen, with a number
on it (call it n), and a numerical keypad. Achilles knows that n
is the number of people who are living below the poverty line.
He also knows that, as soon as he enters a number into the
computer, that many people will be raised above the poverty
line (at no cost to Achilles) and the door will open. There is
no other way of opening the door. Because of the mechanics of
the machine, any door-opening number takes as much time and
effort to enter (negligible) as any other.11
Achilles then inputs some number (p) lower than n. Obviously, in doing
so, he condemns n – p people to continued poverty. His only justification for
doing so is that this number was “good enough”. Our response to this sort
of gratuitous prevention of good is obviously unfavourable, and for most of
us, this is a knock-out blow for (traditional) satisficing consequentialism.12
Satisficing consequentialism is supposed to help us avoid some of the
(seemingly) bad verdicts we get from maximising act consequentialism, namely
that we act wrongly almost always, and that what seem like generous peo-
ple actually (except when they do successfully maximise) act impermissibly.
But if we accept satisficing, it looks like we must condone behaviours like
Achilles’s here. However, this result seems (for many of us) similarly un-
palatable.13
Because of this objection, the move to a satisficing view seems fruitless.
11Tim Mulgan, ‘Slote’s Satisficing Consequentialism’, Ratio 6, pp. 121-134, at 125.
12Elsewhere, Mulgan offers even more alarming examples, suggesting that satisficers are
committed, in some circumstances, to condoning murder (Tim Mulgan, ‘How Satisficers
Get Away With Murder’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2001), pp.
41-46).
13de Lazari-Radek and Singer note that this conclusion “may be just as hard to accept as
the maximizing conclusion” delivered by act consequentialism (e.g. Katarzyna de Lazari-
Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary
Ethics (Oxford, 2014), p. 143.)
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As Bradley correctly concluded, to be made acceptable, satisficers must
demonstrate both that their theory is well-motivated (i.e. that there is some
problem it solves that extant views fail to deal with appropriately) and
that they are able to provide a version that does not permit the gratuitous
prevention of goodness. In the next section, I discuss the new satisficing
account Chappell has formulated that appears promising.
2 Satisficing Consequentialism: The Reboot
Act consequentialism is often rejected because it seems to demand too much.
If the demandingness is understood simply in terms of costs to welfare,
the objection fails because act consequentialism actually minimises costs to
welfare, once the welfare of the moral patients is taken into account.14
Due to this type of worry, Chappell and others have speculated that we
should instead understand what makes an action too demanding in terms
of difficulty.15 Chappell in particular discusses the willpower an action re-
quires. For this reason, he describes his view as Willpower Satisficing Con-
sequentialism.16
Chappell holds that agents are morally required to act in a way that
displays adequate moral concern. In explicating his view of moral concern,
Chappell draws upon “Quality of Will” accounts. These hold “feelings of
14This problem for demandingness objections is discussed by David Sobel (‘The Impo-
tence of the Demandingness Objection’, Philosophers’ Imprint 7, pp. 1-17), and leads him
to reject that the demandingness objection against act consequentialism has any force.
15For further discussion of this conception, see McElwee (Brian McElwee, ‘What is
Demandingness?’, in M. van Ackeren and M. Kuhler (eds.), The Limits of Moral Obliga-
tion: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can (New York, 2016), pp. 19-35), who
is favourable, and Cohen, who briefly discusses but dismisses it (G. A. Cohen, ‘If You’re
an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?’, The Journal of Ethics 4 (2000), pp. 1-26,
at 24.). Dana Nelkin also defends the view that moral status of an action (the degree of
praiseworthiness/blameworthiness) is dependent upon its difficulty (Dana Nelkin, ‘Diffi-
culty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness’, Nouˆs 50 (2016), pp.
356-378.
16Henceforth WSC.
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blame to be warranted when the target of the attitude has acted in a way that
displays inadequate moral concern.” 17 Specifically, Chappell understands
“moral concern” as a combination of two factors:
Altruistic Concern: The extent to which an agent values others’ welfare.
Strength of will: The mental effort an agent puts in to promoting general
welfare.
Someone with limited altruistic concern – a miserly, Scrooge-like char-
acter – thus may have to expend a great deal of mental effort to express the
adequate moral concern a much more agreeable person would express easily.
Rather than outcomes, it is the moral concern an agent expresses which
must be good enough. For Chappell, the level of moral concern which is good
enough is settled by our theories of blameworthiness, and specifically, quality
of will accounts. Greater moral concern typically promotes the general good
and it is obligatory to express sufficient moral concern. More is better, but
less is impermissible.
Because what moral concern counts as sufficient is settled by our theories
of judgement (e.g. about the quality of will), and the moral concern a person
exhibits is a function of their altruistic concern and their strength of will,
Chappell is able to express the maximum effort an agent must expend in a
situation. He calls this the effort ceiling, which he defines as follows:
The Effort Ceiling X (for an agent at a time): that value X such that, in
order to qualify as “adequately concerned” according to our prior the-
17Chappell, ‘Willpower Satisficing’, p. 256. Specifically Chappell makes use of the
accounts given by Arpaly (Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral
Agency (Oxford, 2003)) and Strawson (Peter Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Pro-
ceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962), pp. 1-15). I will not discuss the intricacies of
these accounts here.
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ory of blameworthiness and quality of will, the agent must be willing
to expend up to X willpower in pursuit of the general good.18
To elucidate, we have some prior notions about how much people need
to do with regards to promoting the general good. Moral concern is seen as
a combination of both altruistic concern and strength of will. A particularly
selfish agent will have minimal altruistic concern, so to meet X, they may
need to put in a great deal of willpower, whereas someone who is particularly
other-regarding (having a high amount of altruistic concern) may need a
very low amount of willpower to meet X. It does not take much willpower
on behalf of an altruistically-disposed agent in order for them to act well,
whereas the miser may find that it extremely motivationally difficult.
Chappell makes use of this effort ceiling in order to offer his version of
willpower satisficing consequentialism.
WSC An act A is permissible iff it produces no less utility than any alter-
native action the agent could perform at the cost of up to either (i) X
willpower, or (ii) the willpower cost of A, whichever is greater.19
Any act which causes less utility than could be produced with X, or
which does not produce as much utility as could be provided for the amount
of effort expended, is thus regarded as impermissible. The limits of moral
demands are set by the willpower effort ceiling. With this in mind, we can
see that a prescription is overly demanding if it requires more willpower than
X.
As Chappell notes, this gives felicitous verdicts in the cases of gratuitous
prevention of goodness. The standard moral satisficer must accept that it is
18Chappell, ‘Willpower Satisficing’, p. 257.
19Chappell, ‘Willpower Satisficing’, p. 255.
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sometimes permissible to perform an action much worse than one could, at
a whim or for no reason, and even though it is just as easy – requires just
as much exertion of the will – as other options. Chappell is able to avoid
this unpleasant consequence. Consider Mulgan’s Magic Game example. The
effort ceiling, X, in this case, is the (minimal) effort of Achilles inputting
the numbers. WSC then requires that he do as much good as possible, with
this amount of effort (or perform some morally efficient act which does more
good). As we would hope, WSC will give us the verdict that Achilles must
input the number n.
Mulgan actually suggested that an “effort satisficing” view – like Chap-
pell’s – was possible in The Demands of Consequentialism, noting a tempta-
tion to “think that Slote can construct a Satisficing Consequentialism based
on the notion of ‘good-enough effort’”.20 However, this is definitely not what
Slote had in mind. In fact, Chappell’s account could not give the verdicts
that Slote favours in several of his examples. This might not be too much of
a problem for WSC, as these cases (the Hotel case and Fallen Hero) are not
the sort that motivate satisficing consequentialism (i.e. instances where the
demands placed on the agent by act consequentialism seem unreasonable).
Mulgan raises a potentially bigger worry, that Slote could not make the
‘good enough’ concern effort rather than outcomes, because it would not
provide a consequentialist explanation for the permissibility of sub-optimal
acts:
[Slote’s] original theory provides an explanation: morality
does not make unreasonable demands, because it never requires
that agents produce more than a certain amount of good. Here,
the limit on the costs an agent can be asked to bear is explained
20Mulgan, Demands of Consequentialism, p. 138.
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by appealing to a feature of the outcome of her actions. This is
both an explanation and a Consequentialist explanation.21
However, if the reason we are permitted to act sub-optimally is because
it is accepted that we are not required to expend unreasonable efforts, this is
no longer justified, at its core, in terms of consequences. A major motivation
for satisficing consequentialism is the general appeal of consequentialism but
a dislike of the maximising aspects, so if the resulting theory is no longer
consequentialist – explaining obligations in terms of values of outcomes –
this might be seen as a significant cost for WSC.
I don’t think this is a major concern. The WSC formulation does de-
fine rightness in terms of utility, so it does seem appropriate to call this
consequentialist.22 My worry, however, is not that the theory isn’t conse-
quentialist enough, but that it still fails to give the right verdicts. In the
next section I suggest that Chappell’s account incorrectly assesses as imper-
missible actions which are good, but not as good as others which require the
same effort.
3 Responding to Chappell
A feature of Chappell’s account is that is requires that any supererogation be
efficient. While this is accurate in some cases, I argue that it overgeneralises.
Sometimes, an agent can do more than required without having to do as
much good as possible for the willpower exerted.
21Mulgan, Demands of Consequentialism, p. 138.
22In one sense I am not interested in whether it should be categorised in this way
– if it’s right, it’s right! But in terms of what explains the moral properties of acts –
as suggested in Gary Watson, ‘On the Primacy of Character’, in O. Flanagan and A.
Rorty (eds.), Identity, Character and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, (Cambridge
Massachusetts, 1997), pp. 449-469 – this does seem appropriate.
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Of course, we can grant that acting in a way to deliberately and gratu-
itously cause less good than one might is often a bad thing. This is clear
in Mulgan’s Achilles case. We can also notice this in cases where an agent
seems to be under no obligation to act at all. Consider Kagan’s case where
an agent has to choose whether or not to run into a burning building to
rescue survivors.23 We may accept, given the level of risk that they would
face, that it is perfectly permissible for an agent not to enter, i.e. to do
nothing (expending zero effort). However, if they do choose to enter, and
once inside they have a choice to save either a bird or a baby, it seems that
they are under an obligation to save the baby, rather than the bird. Doing
nothing is fine, running in to save the baby is fine, but running in to save
the bird (we typically think) is not okay. This is an instance of gratuitous
sub-optimal supererogation.
Chappell is also able to get the correct verdict here. If one is under
no obligation, the X value would be zero, but if one expends the effort to
run into the building, they must produce no less utility than any alternative
they might perform at the cost of up to that willpower. Again, WSC looks
good. However, while WSC successfully condemns gratuitous prevention of
goodness, it also condemns any supererogation which is inefficient, i.e. that
does not produce the most possible utility for the effort expended. This
causes some problems, as not all instances of inefficient supererogation seem
morally pernicious.
Consider philanthropic giving. While squandering one’s money by do-
nating to a charity one believes foolishly wastes their donations (but does
some good) strikes us as clearly bad, many of us would recoil at the prospect
of condemning anyone who gives a substantial amount of their income to a
23Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford, 1989), p. 16.
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not-perfectly-efficient charity – perhaps even the second-best charity. Chap-
pell’s account requires that any time we go above the effort ceiling, we are
morally required to do the best we could at that effort level. This seems
implausible. If someone did give all their disposable income to the second
best charity, it would seem extremely inappropriate to condemn them for
doing so (discarding any other bad-making moral features).24
We can even consider much more mundane examples. Imagine the min-
imum you can do for Mothers’ Day is send a card and make a phone call.
You realise also that the best thing to do, would be to take her out to her
favourite restaurant (Mother’s Choice). However, a close-second would be
to take her out to a restaurant you prefer (Child’s Choice), which she also
likes. The amount you prefer the Child’s Choice (by stipulation) is slightly
less than the amount your mother prefers Mother’s Choice. Assuming at-
tending either restaurant would take the same amount of effort – the price
of the food is similar, the distance to travel is the same, etc. – WSC is com-
mitted to condemning taking her to Child’s Choice. But you are permitted
do simply call and send a card, which generates much less utility!
In this case, there is something that counts in favour of performing the
act with less utility. You prefer the food at this restaurant. We might
think that your knowing this could make it the case that going to Mother’s
Choice is slightly more difficult – motivating oneself to go there takes a little
bit more of your willpower. Unfortunately, if an agent’s mild preferences
are taken to affect willpower in this way, WSC loses its ability to give the
felicitous verdicts in many of the previous problem cases for satisficing con-
24Even many effective altruists accept this verdict. Pummer, for instance, defends the
claim that it is wrong to do much less good than one can when costs are equal, but accepts
that in various circumstances it is permissible to do some less good (e.g. Theron Pummer,
‘All or Nothing, but If Not All, Next Best or Nothing’, Journal of Philosophy 116 (2019),
pp. 278-291).
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sequentialism. Take the bird and the baby case. If an agent has a particular
fondness of birds which would make it very slightly more unpleasant for
them to leave the bird, they would be permitted, according to WSC, to opt
to save the bird over the baby. This is a very undesirable verdict.
Chappell could respond to examples like these by amending the sec-
ond clause of WSC, which says that for actions requiring effort more than
the effort ceiling, the act must promote as much utility as possible at that
willpower cost. He might, for instance, remove it:
WSC2 An act A is permissible iff it produces no less utility than any alter-
native action the agent could perform at the cost of up to X willpower.
However, doing so would lead a big problem, as this would condone all
sub-optimal supererogation, even where this looks dubious, as with Kagan’s
bird-saver. Another example where this looks like the wrong result is in Joe
Horton’s illustration of the ‘all or nothing problem’, where an agent has the
following options:25
1. Do nothing
2. Save one child by allowing both your arms to be crushed
3. Save two children by allowing both your arms to be crushed
Because of the huge cost involved, it seems permissible to do nothing
here, so for WSC no effort is required. If WSC was amended to only require
actions that produce the maximum utility at that level of effort (none), any
of the other two actions would be permissible. However, Horton contends,
plausibly, that it is obviously wrong to decide to only save one child, when
one could – at no extra cost or effort – have saved two.
25Joe Horton, ‘The All or Nothing Problem’, The Journal of Philosophy 114, pp. 94-104,
at 94.
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Another way Chappell might amend WSC would be as follows:
WSC3 An act A is permissible iff (i) it produces no less utility than any
alternative action the agent could perform at the cost of up to X
willpower or (ii) A requires more willpower than X and satisfies con-
dition C.
Where C stipulates a certain relationship between, for instance, the
additional utility gained for an agent and the utility gained external to the
agent. This could function like Scheﬄer’s agent-centred prerogatives,26 so
that above the effort ceiling an agent could count their own interests as
more weighty than others’ interests. This could even be supplemented with
constraints on harming others to avoid verdicts such as it being permissible
to expend effort above the effort ceiling to harm someone else by a similar
amount it would benefit an agent by.
However, whatever way such a condition, C, is construed, if it only op-
erates over values of personal and impersonal utility produced, it still seems
unsatisfactory. To see why, consider the following two cases.
1. Take Kagan’s example of the bird and the baby, however in this case
the bird is mine. Because of the danger it is permissible to do nothing.
It is also permissible for me to run in to save the baby. It is not
permissible to save the bird. Even if the bird is mine, saving the
bird seems impermissible. Thus, the condition should not deem it
permissible to make myself slightly happier to expend some effort in
saving a bird rather than a baby.
2. I donate a significant sum of money (supererogatorily) to the second-
best charity. I opt for this because I know someone who suffers from a
26Samuel Scheﬄer, The Rejection of Consequentialism, (Oxford, 1982).
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disease it treats, and this gives me a warm feeling inside. We typically
view this as permissible.27
Let me stipulate that the warm feeling in case 2 is, in terms of my per-
sonal utility, the same as I would gain from saving the bird in the first case.
The difference in the alternative costs, however, is significantly higher in the
charity example. The second-best charity might be able to save hundreds
of lives fewer with the money I donate. So any condition simply operating
over utility values could not allow WSC to give the desired verdicts.
Perhaps a more promising way of amending WSC could be to replace the
second clause of WSC with something like an ‘Avoid Gratuitous Worseness’
principle.28 This could impose a requirement that any inefficient giving is
not simply gratuitous, i.e. that something counts in its favour. If this was not
sufficiently strong, however, this would permit one to save the bird rather
than the baby, or even save only one child’s life in Horton’s case, so long
as the agent can find some reason that counts in its favour. Developing
an account of what makes certain acts objectionably gratuitous would then
be challenge. However, a satisfactory answer to this question looks set to
render the rest of the WSC apparatus redundant, as this would seemingly
tell us everything that WSC sought to explain.
Another response available is accepting that WSC clashes with some
common intuitions, but still find it suitable. We could suggest that intu-
itions are misleading in certain situations, so it is reasonable to expect some
verdicts that clash with our judgements. In the philanthropy case, effective
27Maximisers like de Lazari-Radek and Singer would disagree (e.g. Katarzyna de Lazari-
Radek and Peter Singer, ‘Doing our Best for Hedonistic Utilitarianism, Ethics & Politics
18 (2016), pp. 187-207, at 197) but they reject the move to satisficing consequentialism
anyway.
28Theron Pummer, ‘Whether and Where to Give’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 44
(2016), pp. 77-95, at 93.
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altruists and others might welcome the verdict that giving sub-optimally
actually is morally impermissible.
However, I think we have independent reason to reject WSC, namely
that it can condone certain actions justified self-interested reasons, but is
unable to permit better actions, which would carry similar justifications. To
illustrate, consider again the Mothers’ Day case. Presumably, it is because
I am allowed to give some weight to my own self-interested reasons that I
am morally permitted to merely send a card and make a phone call. So
self-interest permits me exerting less willpower, and consequently producing
less good. WSC can accept this, as our blaming practices permit some
self-interested behaviours. But, the same explanation – my self-interest –
does not permit doing less good when I do want to put more effort in. Self-
interest, under WSC, can therefore permit doing no good at all (or negligible
good, in this situation), but not doing significant good inefficiently.
For WSC then, self-interest can justify omitting to act, but not justify
choosing one option over another at the same willpower. It would seem
bizarre if the permissibility of my acting slightly self-interestedly depends
only on how much effort I exert.
4 Concluding Remarks
Chappell’s willpower satisficing successfully avoids condoning the gratuitous
prevention of good. This was a disastrous and unacceptable result. The ex-
amples I have provided show that WSC also gives strange verdicts. Denying
the intuitive verdicts in the cases I have supplied, as required by WSC,
would not require as revisionary treatment of our moral landscape.
But I do regard the verdicts as a problem, and a serious one. Chappell
has, by implanting the ‘quality of will’ and willpower concepts, resurrected
17
satisficing consequentialism into a stronger candidate for a moral theory.
However, the account still fails to match up with huge classes of typical
moral intuitions.29
29I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers and the editors at Utilitas for helpful
suggestions on a previous version of this paper. A short version of this paper was presented
at the 2019 Joint Session at Durham, so thanks also to the organisers for the opportunity
to present at that venue, and for the questions of the audience. Big thanks also to Lizzy
Ventham for reading a typo-ridden and rambling version of this, and suggesting many
much-needed cuts!
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